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63 
“THE (NEW) NEW COLOSSUS”:  AMENDING 
THE INVESTOR VISA PROGRAM TO 
COMPORT WITH THE MANDATE OF THE 
UNITED STATES’ IMMIGRATION POLICY 
AND BENEFIT U.S. WORKERS 
BRENDAN LEE * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Give me your hired, your entrepreneur, 
Your upper classes willing to pay a fee . . . 
 Taken as a whole, the United States’ relationship with 
immigration has been a paradox.  On one hand, the United States 
has been a “melting pot”—the place where peoples from across the 
globe have converged to form our unique cultural heritage.  
Indeed, our nation owes its very existence to the millions of 
immigrants who have undertaken the voyage to our shores, drawn 
by the promise of a better life in the “land of opportunity.”  On the 
other hand, the United States’ attitude toward immigration, for 
more of its history than we care to acknowledge, has been, and 
continues to be, inextricably linked to racist, nativist, economic 
and other social forces that have pervaded the nation since its 
birth.1 
For the first one hundred years of its existence, the United 
States offered virtually unimpeded access to immigration.2 The 
Act of March 3, 1875, known as “The Page Act of 1875,” 
represented Congress’ first foray into the restriction of 
immigration.3 In effect, the Act, focusing on the exclusion of 
prostitutes, particularly Chinese prostitutes, systematically 
 
 *   St. John’s University School of Law J.D. Candidate, 2016. 
1 Kevin R. Johnson, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH 16-17 (2004). 
2 See IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 3 (14th ed. 2014). 
3 Id. 
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barred all Chinese women from entering the United States.4 The 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 marked the first instance in which 
Congress imposed limitations on immigration explicitly based on 
race.5 The Act barred virtually all immigrations of persons of 
Chinese ancestry and severely punished Chinese immigrants who 
violated its exclusionary provisions.6 Although Equal Protection 
Clause jurisprudence demands strict scrutiny of racial 
classifications for citizens, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
upheld the use of such racial discrimination as a basis for denying 
the admission of (noncitizen) immigrants into the United States.7 
Over the next fifty years, Congress continually introduced similar 
legislation aimed at other groups as well. 
 By 1924, the prevailing political and social forces8 
converged, culminating in the Immigration Act of 1924.9 The Act 
established the national origins quota system (“quota system”), a 
formulaic device designed to ensure the stability of the ethnic 
composition of the United States.10 A House report articulates the 
purpose of this act, stating, “[The quota system] is used in an effort 
to preserve, as nearly as possible, the racial status quo in the 
United States.  It is also hoped to guarantee, as best we can at this 
late date, racial homogeneity.”11  Although the quota system left a 
 
4 Johnson, supra note 1, at 126. 
5 Johnson, supra note 1, at 17. 
6 Id. 
7 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (noting that “[t]he 
power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the 
government of the United States as part of those sovereign powers delegated by the 
constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the government, 
the interest of the country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any 
one.”). 
8 By 1924, political forces such as isolationism in the wake of World War I and prevalent 
fears of communism and anarchism combined with social influences such as nativism, social 
Darwinism and eugenics, culminated in the National Origins Quota System of the 
Immigration Act of 1924. 
9 Johnson, supra note 1, at 23. “The racial hierarchy endorsed by proponents of the 
national origins quota system was entirely consistent with the academic literature of the 
day, which viewed the “races” of southern and eastern Europe as inferior to those of 
northern Europe.” 
10 Id. at 22. 
11 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, REPORT ON 
RESTRICTION OF IMMIGRATION, H.R. REP. NO. 68-350, pt. 1, at 13-14, 16 (1924).  
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blemish on the world’s perception of the United States, it 
nonetheless remained intact until 1965.12 
 As the twentieth century wore on, popular opinion (most 
notably among U.S. Presidents), of the quota system began to 
shift.  Over the veto of President Harry S. Truman, Congress 
maintained the system in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952.13 By 1963, it was President John F. Kennedy who urged 
Congress to overhaul the United States’ immigration policy, 
recommending legislation that concentrated attention primarily 
on revision of the “quota immigration system.”14 President Lyndon 
B. Johnson shared his predecessor’s belief and sought the 
elimination of the quota system, stating, “The system violated the 
basic principles of American democracy—the principal that values 
and rewards each man on the basis of his merit as a man.”15   
On the heels of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress passed the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (“INA”).  Seeking to 
eliminate the national origins quota system as a basis for the 
selection of immigrants for admission to the United States, the 
new system was designed to further a number of policy interests, 
with preference “based upon the existence of close family 
relationships to U.S. citizens and permanent residents,” and 
“those professional people whose services are urgently needed in 
the United States.”16 To this end, the INA replaced the quotas with 
across-the-board annual numerical limits of immigrants from each 
nation.17 
The INA also marked a colossal shift in the United States’ 
immigration policy, mandating “a new system of selection for 
immigrants which is designed to be fair, rational, humane, and in 
the national interests.”18 It is against this mandate that the INA 
and subsequent immigration legislation ought to be measured.   
 
12 Johnson, supra note 1, at 24. 
13 Id. at 22 (explaining “President Harry S. Truman vetoed the INA [of 1952] (a veto 
that Congress overrode) because it carried forward the discriminatory quota system.”). 
14 H.R. REP. NO. 89-745 (1965). 
15 President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill, 
Liberty Island, New York , Oct. 3, 1965, available at 
<www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/Johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/651003.asp>. 
16 89 CONG. REC. 21, 571-72 (1965) (statement of Rep. Delaney). 
17 Johnson, supra note 1, at 26. 
18 89 CONG. REC. 21 at 571 (1965) (statement of Rep. Delaney). 
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The United States’ immigration law (including the INA) fails to 
fulfill the mandate of the INA.  Although there are no longer 
explicitly race-based quotas, the existing ‘per country levels’ create 
a de facto barrier to immigrants from certain countries.  This Note 
addresses our need to fulfill the mandate of the INA by enacting 
legislation that seeks to admit immigrants on a “fair, rational, 
[and] humane” basis that is “in the national interest.”19 
Part I of this Note will examine the failure of the INA, focusing 
on the de facto quota system implemented in place of the explicit 
national origins quota system.  Further, it will show how the 
Immigration Act of 1990 failed to address this problem. 
Part II of this Note will look specifically at the EB-5 Investor 
Visa Program created by the Immigration Act of 1990.  This part 
will explore the practical usage and advantages conferred to those 
who participate in the program.  In addition, this part will analyze 
how these advantages give rise to disparate effects among 
prospective immigrants of differing economic means and thus run 
afoul of the INA’s mandate for admission based on “fair, rational, 
[and] humane” considerations. 
Part III of this Note turns to the twin purpose of the EB-5 
Investor Visa Program itself:  first, to attract the investment of 
foreign capital in the United States, and second, to promote the 
creation of U.S. jobs.  This part of the Note will examine the 
changes Congress made to the EB-5 Investor Visa Program 
through the legislation of the Investor Visa Pilot Program and how 
that program further favors the goal of attracting capital 
investment at the cost of actual job creation.  Part IV of this Note 
examines how other provisions of the overall EB-5 program also 
favor the goal of attracting capital investment at the expense of 
actual job creation. 
Part V of this note proposes a new immigrant visa preference 
category:  the EB-7 Immigrant Job Creator Visa Program, which 
is designed to provide relief to immigrants subject to the more 
onerous de facto quotas imposes by the INA and carried through 
by the Immigration Act of 1990 while at the same time overhauling 
the EB-5 Investor Visa Program to comport with the overarching 
 
19 Id. 
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policy goals set forth in the INA as well as the policy goals of the 
program itself. 
Finally, Part VI will illustrate how the proposed EB-7 
Immigrant Job Creator Visa Program will harmonize the United 
States’ immigration law with the overarching policy goals of the 
INA. 
II. FAILURE TO ELIMINATE QUOTAS:  “PER COUNTRY” 
LEVELS 
 
Despite the sweeping changes enacted by the INA, most notably 
the abolition of the quota system, it has failed to achieve its 
mandate.20 Many aspects of the United States’ immigration laws 
disparately impact immigrants from developing nations.21 While 
not facially discriminatory, in operation, the INA created 
exceedingly long lines for immigrants from four countries in 
particular:22 China (mainland-born), India, Mexico, and the 
Philippines.23 For example, as of October 2014, the United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) is processing 
only those applications for fourth-preference family-based 
immigration visas (brothers and sisters of adult citizens) of 
Filipino foreign-nationals filed prior to April 8, 1991.24 This 
twenty-three year waiting list for prospective Filipino immigrants 
with a U.S. citizen sibling is more than ten years longer than any 
other country other than Mexico.25 Similarly, as of October 2014, 
USCIS is processing only those applications for third-preference 
employment-based visas (skilled workers or professionals 
possessing the equivalent of a Bachelor’s degree) of Indian foreign-
nationals filed prior to November 15, 2003.26 This represents a 
 
20 Johnson, supra note 1, at 26. 
21 Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Immigrant Numbers for October 
2014, No. 73, Vol. IX, 2-3 (2014). 
22 Id. 
23 These four countries, China (mainland-born), India, Mexico, and the Philippines will 
heretofore be known as “traditionally oversubscribed” nations, as they are subject to 
waiting periods that differ from the rest of the world. 
24 Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Immigrant Numbers for October 
2014, No. 73, Vol. IX, at 2 (2014). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
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waiting period of nearly eight years longer than any other country 
other than China.27  
 
III. THE EB-5 PROGRAM 
 
In furtherance of its objectives embodied in the INA, Congress 
passed the Immigration Act of 1990 (“IMMACT”), the most 
comprehensive change to the immigration system since 1965.28  
IMMACT has four main policy goals.29 First, it established overall 
limits on immigration through the adoption of a flexible cap on 
total numbers.30 Second, it permitted the continued reunification 
of close family members.31 Third, IMMACT sought to meet labor 
market needs by increasing the number of immigrants admitted 
for employment-based reasons and giving higher priority to the 
entry of professionals and highly skilled workers.32 Fourth, it 
sought to provide greater diversity through new opportunities for 
migration from countries with relatively small numbers of 
immigrants to the United States.33 
 Despite these broad reforms, IMMACT still fails immigrants 
from traditionally oversubscribed nations.  Immigrants from these 
nations are still subject to longer waiting periods for visa 
processing than immigrants from other chargeability areas.   
Most significantly to this Note, IMMACT created a new visa 
category with the aim of attracting investment capital to the 
country and creating new jobs for U.S. workers:  the EB-5 visa.34 
The EB-5 program is based on our nation’s twin interest in 
promoting the immigration of people who, first, invest their capital 
in new, restructured, or expanded businesses in the United States, 
 
27 Id. 
28 U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, 1994 Executive Summary, 33 (1994). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 ICF International, Study of the United States Immigrant Investor Pilot Program 
(EB-5), 1 (2010) available at 
<https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/E
B-5/EB5-Report-2010.pdf>. 
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and second, create much-needed jobs for U.S. workers.35  Under 
the EB-5 program, foreign nationals are eligible for conditional 
permanent residency in the United States (a “green card”) for two 
years36 by investing $1 million37 in a U.S. business that would 
directly create at least ten full-time jobs.38 After two years, if the 
foreign national has satisfied the conditions of the EB-5 program 
and other criteria of eligibility, the conditions are removed and the 
immigrant investor may become an unconditional lawful 
permanent resident of the United States.39   
A. EB-5 Program Advantages to the Immigrant Investor 
 The EB-5 Immigrant Investor Visa Program is 
advantageous to the immigrant investor in a multitude of ways.  
First, the EB-5 visa has always been “current.”  This means that 
there is no waiting list for prospective immigrants; as soon as they 
submit their application, USCIS will begin processing their 
application.  This makes the EB-5 program particularly appealing 
to those immigrants who, because of circumstance, are subject to 
relatively long waiting periods.  Any prospective immigrant, who, 
for instance, premises his or her immigrant visa application on a 
familial relationship to a U.S. citizen sibling, must wait almost 
eleven years (at least) before USCIS will begin processing his or 
her application.  However, the same individual immigrant may (if 
he or she has a minimum of $500,000 to spare) file an EB-5 
immigrant visa application, which USCIS will begin processing 
immediately upon receipt. 
 
35 U.S Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S Citizenship and Immigration Services, Policy 
Memorandum: EB-5 Adjudications Policy, PM-602-0083 at 1 (May 30, 2013) available at 
<https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2013/May/EB-
5%20Adjudications%20PM%20(Approved%20as%20final%205-30-13).pdf>. 
36 Id. at 1-2. Congress enacted this two-year conditional permanent residency status to 
ensure compliance with the statutory and regulatory requirements and to ensure that the 
investment of capital in fact created the requisite ten full-time jobs in the United States. 
37 Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(f)(2), an immigrant investor need only invest a 
minimum of $500,000 in capital if he or she invests his or her capital in a new commercial 
enterprise that is principally doing business in, and creates jobs in, a rural area or a 
“targeted employment area,” defined as an area with a rate of unemployment at least 150% 
of the national average rate of unemployment. 
38 ICF International, supra note 34, at 1. 
39 U.S Dep’t of Homeland Security, supra note 35, at 1. 
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B. Disparate Impact of Investor Visa Program 
The EB-5 investor visa program is inherently discriminatory.  
The required initial investment of $500,000 (and in many cases, 
$1,000,000) in a new commercial enterprise represents a massive 
barrier to participation in the program for immigrants from 
developing nations or of lesser means.  Even more burdensome, 
the investment must be placed “at risk” for the purpose of 
generating a return.40 In other words, prospective immigrant 
investors are unable to satisfy the investment of capital 
requirement by merely financing debt as opposed to equity 
investments.41 They must not only have $500,000, but also be in a 
position to place such a vast sum of money at risk, with no 
guarantee of its return.   
This economically discriminatory policy gives rise to disparate 
results among prospective immigrants from different countries.  
According to a 2005 report of the United States Government 
Accountability Office,42 eighty-three percent of the EB-5 visas 
issued from 1992 to 2004 have been issued to immigrant investors 
from Asia.43 More specifically, Taiwan alone accounted for thirty-
nine percent of the EB-5 visas issued.44 During the same 
timeframe, South America and Africa have each only accounted 
for two percent of the EB-5 visas issued, or 143 and 122 visas 
respectively. 
A 2010 study by ICF International yielded similar results.45 
Based on a sample of 295 immigrant investors, ICF found that 
seventy-eight percent of immigrant investors are from Asia.46  
Furthermore, Europe was the second-most represented continent, 
accounting for just over fifteen percent of the total number of 
issued EB-5 visas.47 Meanwhile, North America, South America 
 
40 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(2). 
41 U.S. GAO,  Immigrant Investors: Small Number of Participants Attributed to 
Pending Regulations and Other Factors, GAO 05-256, 12 (2005) available at 
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05256.pdf>. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 15. 
44 Id. at 12. 
45 See ICF International, supra note 34. 
46 Id. at 9. 
47 Id. 
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and Africa accounted for less than seven percent of the issued EB-
5 visas combined.48  Even more striking are the statistics 
pertaining to EB-5 investors from the traditionally oversubscribed 
nations:  Mexico, India, the Philippines, and China (mainland). 
   
1. Mexico 
In the fiscal year 2013, Mexican immigrant investors accounted 
for sixty-three of the 7,312 total EB-5 visas issued—less than one 
percent.49  Indeed, 2013 actually marked a significant uptick in 
EB-5 visa subscription among prospective Mexican immigrants.  
Over the four prior fiscal years, from 2009 to 2012, there had only 
been thirty-seven total EB-5 visas issued to Mexican immigrant 
investors.50 
2. India 
 In the fiscal year 2013, Indian immigrant investors 
accounted for thirty-five of the 7,312 total EB-5 visas issued—less 
than half of one percent.51 Over the four prior fiscal years, from 
2009 to 2012, there had only been eighty-nine total EB-5 visas 
issued to Indian immigrant investors.52 
3. Philippines 
 In the fiscal year 2013, Filipino immigrant investors 
accounted for only five of the 7,312 total EB-5 visas issued—a 
statistically irrelevant figure.53 Even more bleak, over the four 
prior fiscal years, from 2009 to 2012, there had only been two total 
EB-5 visas issued to Filipino immigrant investors.54 
 
48 Id. 
49 Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Report of the Visa Office 2013, VI. 
Preference Immigrant Visas Issued (by Foreign State of Chargeability): Fiscal Year 2013, 
Part 4 (Employment 5th, Schedule A, Grand Total) (2009-2013). 
50 Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Report of the Visa Office 2013, VI. 
Preference Immigrant Visas Issued (by Foreign State of Chargeability): Fiscal Year 2013, 
Part 4 (Employment 5th, Schedule A, Grand Total) (2009-2013). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
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4. China (mainland) 
 China stands in stark contrast against the other 
traditionally oversubscribed nations. Over the four prior fiscal 
years, from 2009 to 2012, Chinese immigrant investors accounted 
for over seventy-four percent of all issued EB-5 visas.55 According 
to the most recently available data, this pattern is only trending 
upward.  In the fiscal year 2013, Chinese immigrant investors 
accounted for 6,250 of the 7,312 total EB-5 visas issued—over 
eighty-five percent.56 For the first time ever, in the fiscal year 
2014, the EB-5 visa category was made unavailable to Chinese 
immigrant investors, as demand exceeded the statutory 
allocation.57 
 
IV. THE IMMIGRANT INVESTOR PILOT PROGRAM 
 
The EB-5 program provisions of IMMACT were originally 
contemplated to confer lawful permanent resident status to 
immigrant investors who not only invested, but also engaged in 
the management of employment-creating commercial 
enterprises.58 The program requires the immigrant investor to be 
so engaged, either through the exercise of day-to-day managerial 
responsibility or through policy formulation.59 It is not enough 
that the immigrant investor maintain a purely passive role in 
regard to his or her investment.60 USCIS requires extensive 
documentation of the immigrant investor’s active involvement.61   
 
55 Id. 
56 Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Report of the Visa Office 2013, VI. 
Preference Immigrant Visas Issued (by Foreign State of Chargeability): Fiscal Year 2013, 
Part 4 (Employment 5th, Schedule A, Grand Total) (2009-2013). 
57 Visa Services, U.S. Dep’t of State, Effective immediately Saturday, August 23, 2014 
the China Employment Fifth (EB-5) preference category has become “Unavailable” for the 
remainder of FY-2014, (Aug. 23, 2014).  “This action is necessary because the maximum 
level of numbers which may be made available for use by China EB-5 applicants during 
FY-2014 have been reached.” 
58 U.S Dep’t of Homeland Security, supra note 35, at 2. 
59 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(5). 
60 Id. 
61 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(5)(i)-(iii).  The petition must be accompanied by:  “(i) A statement 
of the position title that the [immigrant investor] has or will have in the new enterprise 
and a complete description of the position’s duties; or, (ii) Evidence that the [immigrant 
investor] is a corporate officer or a member of the corporate board or directors; or, (iii) If the 
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In 1992, Congress relaxed the requirements of the EB-5 
program, creating the Immigrant Investor Pilot Program (“Pilot 
Program”) in order to attract a larger number of applicants.62 The 
Pilot Program did not replace the EB-5 program; it merely created 
a distinct set of statutory requirements for participation in the EB-
5 program.63 Of the 10,000 EB-5 visas available annually, 3,000 
are specifically reserved for immigrant investors who participate 
in the Pilot Program.64   
The Pilot Program65 is advantageous to immigrant investors in 
two major ways.  First, immigrant investors can invest in 
designated “regional centers” that place and manage investments 
on behalf of the investors.66 Second, this newer program provides 
that the full-time positions can be created either directly or 
indirectly by the commercial enterprise in which the investment is 
placed.67 
A. The Regional Centers 
A regional center is “any economic unit, public or private, which 
is involved with the promotion of economic growth, including 
increased export sales, improved regional productivity, job 
creation, and increased domestic capital investment.”68 This may 
include entities ranging from a state government agency to a 
consortium of exporters, specifically any entity benefiting a 
particular geographic of the United States.69 These entities 
formulate a business plan and successfully operate almost all 
business types.70 
 
new enterprise is a partnership, either limited or general, evidence that the [immigrant 
investor] is engaged in either direct managerial or policy making activities. . . .” 
62 ICF International, supra note 34, at 1. 
63 Because of the relaxed statutory standards, EB-5 immigrant investors participating 
in the program overwhelming utilized the Pilot Program. 
64 Id. 
65 PL 112-176 §1, 126 Stat 1325 (Sept. 28, 2012).  The so-called “pilot” program has 
been repeatedly extended, most recently to Sept. 30, 2015.  Congress affirmed its 
commitment to this program by removing the word “pilot” from its reauthorization of the 
program, indicating its permanence.  Still, it remains known as the “Pilot Program.” 
66 ICF International, supra note 34, at 1. 
67 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(4)(iii). 
68 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e). 
69 9 FAM 42.32(E) N8, “Regional Center” Defined. 
70 Id. 
LEE, MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2017  2:26 PM 
74 JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Vol. 30:1 
 
The regional center model within the Pilot Program can offer an 
immigrant investor already-defined investment opportunities, 
thereby reducing the immigrant investor’s responsibility to 
identify acceptable investment vehicles.71 Most importantly, the 
Pilot Program permits immigrant investors to place passive 
investments with the regional center.72 This dramatically reduces 
the burden placed upon prospective immigrant investors:  they are 
no longer required to be engaged in the management of 
employment-creating commercial enterprises, either through the 
exercise of day-to-day managerial responsibility or through policy 
formulation. 
To date, USCIS has approved approximately six hundred 
regional centers.73 This represents a massive increase in the 
number of approved regional centers nationwide.74 In recent 
years, developers seeking to raise capital have increasingly taken 
interest in the EB-5 program, specifically the Pilot Program.75 
Utilizing the program, developers enjoy relatively inexpensive 
borrowing costs, ranging from three to five percent.76 
Furthermore, developers are under no pressure to produce high 
rates of return, as immigrant investors are primarily concerned 
with obtaining permanent residency.77 
B. Direct vs. Indirect Jobs 
The Investor Pilot program provides that the statutorily 
mandated ten full-time positions can be created either directly or 
 
71 U.S Dep’t of Homeland Security, supra note 35, at 14. 
72 Dennis J. Olle and Julie C. Ferguson, EB-5: Project Finance for U.S. Developers and 
Businesses, LEXOLOGY, Jan. 29, 2013, 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4422a94d-22d3-45d9-9ee5-41e5d20428ff . 
73 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Immigrant Investor Regional Centers, 
2014, available at <http://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/permanent-
workers/employment-based-immigration-fifth-preference-eb-5/immigrant-investor-
regional-centers>. 
74 ICF International, supra note 34, at 78..  “As of June 24, 2010, there were 92 USCIS-
approved Regional Centers across the U.S. inclusive of the Territory of Guam.”  Therefore, 
in the last four and a half years, USCIS has approved more than five hundred regional 
centers. 
75 See Olle and Ferguson, supra note 72. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
LEE, MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2017  2:26 PM 
2017 AMENDING THE INVESTOR VISA PROGRAM 75 
 
indirectly by the new commercial enterprise.78 Direct positions are 
those that provide services or labor for the new commercial 
enterprise and receive wages or other remuneration directly from 
the new commercial enterprise.79 Indirect jobs are those that are 
held outside of the new commercial enterprise but are created as 
a result of the new commercial enterprise.80 For example, indirect 
jobs can include, but are not limited to, those held by employees of 
the producers of materials, equipment, or services used by the new 
commercial enterprise.81 Further, the indirect jobs qualify and 
count towards the immigrant investor’s statutory requirement 
even if they are located outside of the geographic boundaries of the 
regional center.82 The ability to rely upon indirect job creation 
substantially lowers the burden placed upon immigrant investors 
in meeting the requirements of the EB-5 visa program.   
Taken together, these two major changes implemented by the 
Pilot Program illustrates not only Congress’ desire to make the 
EB-5 program more appealing to prospective immigrant investors, 
but also a broader shift in policy:  favoring the goal of capital 
investment at the cost of employment creation.83 Initially, the EB-
5 program was criticized for permitting foreign nationals to “buy” 
a visa.84 With the passage of the Pilot Program, it appeared as 
though Congress “green lit” the sale of visas.  By permitting 
immigrant investors to make passive qualifying investments in a 
regional center, it eliminated the requirement that immigrant 
investors actually create an employment-creating commercial 
enterprise.  Immigrant investors now need only cut a check.  
Moreover, the ability to rely on indirect job creation to fulfill the 
requirements of the Pilot Program attenuates the connection 
between the immigrant investor’s investment and actual 
 
78 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(4)(iii). 
79 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e). 
80 U.S Dep’t of Homeland Security, supra note 35, at 18. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 This shift in policy is further demonstrated by change in statute. On November 2, 
2002, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(A)(i) was removed from the statute, which had required that the 
new commercial enterprise be one that the immigrant investor “has established,” him or 
herself. 
84 101 CONG. REC. 14,286 (1989) (statement of Sen. Bumpers).  “But the rich ought not 
to be able to buy their way into the country.” 
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employment creation.  An immigrant investor may use complex 
economic reports such as multiplier tables and feasibility studies 
as evidence of the number of jobs created.85 
 
 
 
V. OTHER SHORTCOMINGS OF THE EB-5 PROGRAM’S 
ABILITY TO  CREATE JOBS 
A. Accounting for Jobs Created 
 A shortcoming of the EB-5 program, and particularly of the 
Pilot Program, is the manner by which USCIS credits the number 
of jobs created as a result of an immigrant investor’s capital 
infusion.  According to a 2005 report by the United States 
Government Accountability Office, it is impossible to determine 
how many jobs immigrant investors have in fact established 
because of USCIS’s accounting methods.86 During the adjudication 
process, USCIS adjudicators ensure that each business creates the 
minimum requirements of ten full-time jobs.87 However, if there 
are non-EB-5 investors involved or the investment is part of a 
greater overall business expansion, USCIS credits the single EB-
5 investor with the total of all jobs created even though many of 
the jobs are not the result of his portion of the investment.88 In one 
particular case, USCIS credited a single immigrant investor with 
creating 1,143 jobs based on a $1.5 million investment.89  Although 
this single investment could not have possibly created all 1,143 
jobs, for adjudicative purposes, when the immigrant investor is the 
only one seeking the immigration benefit of conditional permanent 
residency, all jobs are attributed to that investor.90 This is true 
even if it is the capital of others that is in fact fueling the 
 
85 9 FAM 42.32(E) N10, Meeting the Job Creation Requirement. 
86 U.S. GAO, GAO 05-256, Immigrant Investors:  Small Number of Participants 
Attributed to Pending Regulations and Other Factors (2005), 19, available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05256.pdf. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
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enterprise.91 In this case, the immigrant investor’s capital 
contribution represented a small fraction of a multimillion-dollar 
expansion of an existing business that involved multiple 
franchises and other non-EB-5 investors.92   
The problem with USCIS’s accounting system is that it “credits” 
an immigrant investor with the creation of a job rather than 
insisting that the immigrant investor actually create one.  It is 
easy to imagine a scenario in which a large real estate developer 
would utilize the EB-5 program in order to finance an already-
existing project at low interest rates.  In such a scenario, the 
project’s feasibility would not be contingent upon securing EB-5 
capital—the project (and the jobs it creates) would come into 
existence irrespective of an immigrant investor’s capital infusion.  
However, the real estate developer augments his or her bottom 
line by financing the project at favorable interest rates offered by 
EB-5 capital investments. 
The scenario described above is easy to imagine because it has 
been an on-going reality.  In recent years, businesses, particularly 
real estate and project developers, seeking to raise capital have 
increasingly utilized the EB-5 Program.93 Today, real estate 
developers often use EB-5 capital in lieu of traditional mezzanine 
loans.94 Unlike a traditional mortgage, real estate mezzanine 
loans are collateralized by equity in the real estate developer itself 
rather than the property.95 Because of the higher risk associated 
with mezzanine loans, lenders typically charge exorbitant interest 
rates and fees, ranging from twelve to twenty percent.96 As a 
result, EB-5 investments are tremendously attractive to real 
estate and project developers.  A number of high-profile real estate 
 
91 Id. 
92 U.S. GAO, GAO 05-256, Immigrant Investors:  Small Number of Participants 
Attributed to Pending Regulations and Other Factors (2005), 19, available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05256.pdf. 
93 Julie C. Ferguson, EB-5 Options for Developers, CFJBLAW.COM, (Feb. 11, 2013), 
http://www.cfjblaw.com/eb-5-options-for-developers-02-11-2013/. 
94 Wessem Amin, EB-5 Regional Centers in Project Finance:  Using EB-5 Capital in lieu 
of Mezzanine Financing, DHARLAWLLP.COM, (Nov. 25, 2013) available at 
http://dharlawllp.wordpress.com/2013/11/25/wassem-amin-eb-5-project-finance/ (noting 
“[i]n the context of real estate finance, mezzanine loans are typically used as a source of 
supplementary financing for development projects.”). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
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developers have established regional centers in order to attract 
EB-5 investments to finance their many projects.97 
B. Bridge Financing 
In order to comport with business realities, USCIS has adopted 
a stance permitting the use of “bridge financing” in EB-5 
investment projects.98 The developer or the principal of the new 
commercial enterprise, either directly or through a separate job-
creating entity, may utilize interim or “bridge” financing, in the 
form of debt or equity, prior to the receipt of EB-5 capital.99 In a 
2013 policy memorandum issued by USCIS clarifying the 
adjudication policy of EB-5 immigrant investor visa applications, 
it stated, “. . . even if the EB-5 financing was not contemplated 
prior to acquiring the temporary or ‘bridge’ financing, as long as 
the financing to be replaced was contemplated as short-term 
temporary financing which would subsequently be replaced, the 
infusion of EB-5 financing could still result in the creation of, and 
credit for, new jobs.”100  According to USCIS, developers should not 
be precluded from using EB-5 capital as an alternative source to 
replace temporary financing simply because it was not 
contemplated prior to obtaining the bridge or temporary 
financing.101 This policy pronouncement further illustrates the 
inherent problem with the EB-5 program:  it does not create jobs; 
it merely allocates or “credits” the creation of jobs to prospective 
immigrants that would have been created regardless of their 
investment. 
The strength of capital markets is undoubtedly crucial to the 
development of the nation’s economy.  Indeed, the availability of 
credit is critical to a sustained and healthy economy.  However, 
the evaluation of the EB-5 program is incomplete unless we are 
equally critical of the program’s ability to deliver on its other goal:  
the creation of jobs.  
 
97 Related Companies and Silverstein Properties, developers of the Hudson Yards 
Redevelopment and World Trade Center respectively, have each established regional 
centers in recent years. 
98 U.S Dep’t of Homeland Security, supra note 35, at 15. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 16 (emphasis added). 
101 Id. 
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VI. THE EB-7 IMMIGRANT JOB CREATOR VISA 
 
 This Note proposes a solution:  The EB-7 Immigrant Job 
Creator Visa.  The EB-7 Immigrant Job Creator Visa would read 
as follows: 
 Congress, recognizing the essential role of immigrants in 
building our nation and the need for domestic job creation, does 
hereby establish the Seventh Preference Category for 
Employment-based Immigrant Visas. 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(7) Job-Creator Visa 
 
(A) In general. 
 Visas shall be made available, in a number not to exceed 7.1 
percent of such worldwide level to qualified immigrants seeking to 
enter the United States less the number of visas issued pursuant 
to § 1153(b)(5) of this title in the prior fiscal year, to qualified 
immigrants seeking to enter the United States for the purpose of 
engaging in a new commercial enterprise (including limited 
partnership) — 
 (i)    in which such alien has invested or, is actively in the 
process of investing, capital in an amount not less than the amount 
specified in subparagraph (C), and 
 (ii)  which will benefit the United States economy and create 
full-time employment for not fewer than 10 United States citizens 
or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence or other 
immigrants lawfully authorized to be employed in the United 
States (other than the immigrant and the immigrant's spouse, 
sons, or daughters. 
 
(B) Target employment areas defined. 
 In this paragraph, the term “targeted employment area” 
means, at the time of the investment, a rural area or an area, 
which has experienced high unemployment (of at least 150 percent 
of the national average rate). 
 
(C) Amount of capital required. 
(i)   In general 
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 Except as otherwise provided in this subparagraph the 
amount, of capital required under subparagraph (A) shall be the 
greater of either-- 
(I) $200,000; or 
(II) 20% of the immigrant job-creator’s net worth, to 
be calculated by reasonable economic or 
accounting methodologies. 
(ii) Adjustment for target employment areas defined 
In the case of investment made in a target employment area, the 
immigrant investor may reduce his or her required investment 
under this subparagraph by 25%. 
(iii) Limitations 
Under this subparagraph, an immigrant job-creator shall not be 
required to invest capital in excess of $400,000. 
 
(D) Full-time employment defined. 
 In this paragraph, the term “full-time employment” means 
employment in a position that requires at least 35 hours of service 
per week at any time, regardless of who fills the position. 
  
(E) Job creation requirements. 
 An immigrant job-creator seeking an immigrant visa under 
this subparagraph must demonstrate that his or her qualifying 
investment is in a commercial enterprise-- 
 (i)  that is controlled by the immigrant job creator through 
the exercise of day-to-day managerial responsibility; and 
 (ii)  that directly creates ten full-time jobs. 
 
(F) “But for” causation requirement. 
 In order to demonstrate compliance with subparagraph 
(E)(ii) of this subsection, a immigrant job creator must show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that each of the 10 jobs required 
under subparagraph (A)(ii) would not have been created but for 
the immigrant job creator’s qualifying investment.   
 USCIS shall promulgate rules in accordance with this 
subparagraph to adjudicate compliance with the “but for” 
causation requirement on a case-by-case basis. 
 
(G) Eligibility. 
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 Only immigrant job creators from nations that, pursuant to 
8 U.S.C. 1153(e), are subject to visa cut-off dates that differ from 
all chargeability areas, may apply for the EB-7 Immigrant Job 
Creator Visa Program.  On the date of the enactment of this 
provision, only immigrant job creator from the following nations 
may apply: 
 (i)   China (mainland born); 
 (ii)  India; 
 (iii) Mexico; and 
 (iv) The Philippines. 
 
VII. THE BENEFITS OF THE EB-7 IMMIGRANT JOB CREATOR 
VISA PROGRAM 
 
 The EB-7 Immigrant Job Creator Program addresses many 
issues with our current body of immigration law with a relatively 
small amendment.  First, the EB-7 Immigrant Job Creator Visa 
Program will only be made available to immigrants from 
traditionally oversubscribed nations.  This provision has two 
purposes.  First, it will have the ameliorative effect of granting 
admission to immigrants who are otherwise subject to 
substantially longer waiting periods than all other immigrants.  
This comports with the mandate of the INA.  Second, it will 
substantially limit the applicability of this relatively small 
ameliorative legislation to those immigrants most in need of relief.   
Second, the proposed EB-7 Immigrant Job Creator Visa 
Program does not affect the overall annual limit on immigration.  
By only issuing visas equal to the difference between the total 
allocation of EB-5 visas and the number of EB-5 visas actually 
issued, the EB-7 visa only seeks to make-up this gap in 
enrollment.102 It will be for Congress to determine whether it be 
prudent to increase the overall level of immigration in order to 
issue a higher number of EB-7 immigrant job creator visas. 
 Next, the capital investment requirement is significantly 
reduced.  The EB-7 immigrant job creator’s contribution to the 
 
102 In order to calculate the number of EB-7 Immigrant Job Creator Visas to be issued 
in a fiscal year, the program uses the number of EB-5 visas issued in the prior fiscal year 
as a rough estimate for the number of EB-5 visas that will likely be issued in the current 
fiscal year. 
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United States will be the creation of new jobs for U.S. workers, not 
the infusion of capital.  Acknowledging that some investment of 
capital is necessary for the creation of a new job creating, 
commercial enterprise, a minimum investment of $150,000 (not to 
exceed $400,000) is required.  The immigrant job creator is 
incentivized to establish a job-creating commercial enterprise in a 
target employment area, where the unemployment rate is 150% of 
the national average employment rate.  The EB-7 immigrant job 
creator’s primary investment will be of his or her labor, skills, and 
entrepreneurial talents in creating an employment sustaining 
commercial enterprise. 
 In addition, the EB-7 Immigrant Job Creator Visa Program 
requires that the immigrant job creator’s investment is made in a 
commercial enterprise that is controlled by the immigrant job 
creator through the exercise of day-to-day managerial 
responsibility and that directly creates ten full-time jobs.  This 
provision of the proposed EB-7 Immigrant Job Creator Visa 
Program is to advance its purpose:  the actual creation of jobs for 
U.S. workers, not merely awarding “credit” for the creation of jobs. 
 Lastly, in furtherance of the EB-7 Immigrant Job Creator 
Visa Program’s purpose, the proposal introduces a causation 
requirement.  In order to ensure that the prospective immigrant 
job creator did in fact create the statutorily mandated ten jobs, he 
or she must be able to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that each of the positions would not have been created 
but for the immigrant job creator’s qualifying investment.  Again, 
this provision is included in the proposal in order to ensure the 
actual creation of jobs for U.S. workers.  
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
In order to better serve the immigration policy mandate of the 
INA by admitting immigrants on a “fair, rational, [and] humane” 
basis that is “in the national interest,” we must be critical of our 
current immigration laws.  The EB-7 Immigrant Job Creator Visa 
Program advances this overarching policy, while fulfilling the 
promise of the EB-5 Immigrant Investor Visa Program:  
encouraging foreign investment in the United States and, more 
importantly, creating jobs for U.S. workers. 
